Information Transparency in B2B Auction Markets: Theory and Evidence from a Field Experiment
COM2 Level 4
Executive Classroom, COM2-04-02
ABSTRACT:
With the large amount of data available via different online channels, firms have increasingly viewed information transparency a strategic imperative. This paper studies information transparency in multi-channel B2B auction markets. Unlike previous work that primarily focuses on the revelation of product or price information, we examine how the revelation of winners' identities affects bidding dynamics and seller's revenue. Using a rich dataset from a quasi-natural field experiment at the world's largest flower wholesale market, we find that concealing winners' identities in sequential Dutch auctions leads to a significant increase in prices, and such effect holds for both online and offline channels. Further, our analysis shows that by concealing winner's identities, the price declining trend in sequential rounds can be mitigated substantially. We discuss the theoretical contributions of our findings and their broader implications to practical design of information disclosure policies in complex B2B markets.
BIODATA:
Alok Gupta is the Associate Dean of Faculty and Research and Curtis L. Carlson Schoolwide Chair in Information Management at the Carlson School of Management, University of Minnesota; he is the former chair of the IDSc Department at the Carlson School. In 2014 he was named an INFORMS Information Systems Society (ISS) Distinguished Fellow. He is the in-coming Editor-in-Chief of ISR. He received his Ph.D. in Management Science and Information from the University of Texas, Austin. His research has been published in various information systems, economics, and computer science journals such as Management Science, ISR, MIS Quarterly, CACM, JMIS, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Computational Economics, Decision Support Systems, and many other high quality journals. In addition, his articles have been published in several leading books in economics of electronic commerce. He was awarded a prestigious NSF CAREER Award for his research on dynamic pricing mechanisms on the internet. In addition, his research has won numerous awards including ISS design science award twice in 2011 and 2012. From 1999-2001, he served as co-director of Treibick Electronic Commerce Initiative (TECI), an endowed research initiative at Dept. of OPIM, University of Connecticut. He is also an affiliate of the Center for Research in Electronic Commerce (CREC) at the University of Texas at Austin. He served as Senior Editor for ISR and an Associate Editor for Management Science. He has been serving as Publisher of MIS Quarterly since 2005. He teaches courses in the areas of computer networking, electronic commerce, decision support, IT infrastructure, and computer programming at the undergraduate, MBA and Ph.D. levels.